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§1.7

Evidence Errors—Harmless

The harmless error principle holds that on appellate review (and posttrial motions to set aside a
verdict or judgment), the critical point is not the mere occurrence of error, but the effect of error
on substantial rights. 1 Long ago a distinguished commentator characterized the problem of
harmless error as one of “professional psychology,” 2 and this observation seems true in two
respects. First, the profession must be aware that its tools (including evidence rules) are not perfect
enough to make perfect trials a reasonable goal. Second, the profession must bear in mind that the
process of review is imperfect, particularly in jury-tried cases, since a reviewing court has no sure
way to assess the actual effect of error on the mind or minds of jurors and their collective judgment.
Kotteakos guidelines
A good starting point for looking at harmless error is the opinion by Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos
v. United States, which discussed the matter at length and adopted five guidelines: First,
“technicality” should be avoided unless it affects the rights of the parties, meaning the outcome of
the trial. The message is not to insist on applying rules for their own sake, but to see them as tools
that can help achieve a fair and just result. Second, the reviewing court should appraise error by
examining the proceedings in their entirety. Mistakes should be viewed in the context of the whole
trial. Third (perhaps most important), the problem is not to assess the sufficiency of evidence to
support the result reached, but to decide whether error affected outcome. 3 Fourth, precedent is not
very helpful, and the judgment of the court should be “tempered but not governed in any rigid
sense” by what has been done in similar situations. Fifth, the task of review is not to decide what
the outcome should be or speculate on the outcome of a new trial, but to decide whether the error
affected the judgment. 4
Competing standards
§1.7 1. See FRE 103(a) (error “may not be predicated” on ruling admitting or excluding evidence “unless a
substantial right of the party is affected”); 28 U.S.C. §2111 (reviewing court to ignore “errors or defects which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties”).
2. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 126, 146-148 (1927). See also Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (judging error involves “the play of impression and conviction along with
intelligence” and “varies with judges and also with circumstance”).
3. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-765 (1946) (if “the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect,” verdict and judgment should stand, but “if one cannot say, with fair
assurance” that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, one cannot conclude that substantial rights
were not affected; question is not “merely whether there was enough to support the result,” but whether the error had
substantial influence).
4. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946) (while question is not how next trial will come out or
court’s opinion on the merits, “the outcome does count” and the error must be appraised “against the entire setting of
the record”).

In cases where an error might have affected the judgment, the process of describing reasons to
reverse or affirm is likely to generate language implying a standard of some sort. Three have some
current support: One is a likelihood standard similar to the one usually applied in civil trials. Under
it, error generates reversal or correction unless it “probably” did not affect the judgment. 5 Another
involves a “high probability” standard proposed by a distinguished jurist under which a judgment
is reversed unless the court “believes it highly probable that the error” had no effect. This standard
seems to fall midway between the standards of proof applied in civil and criminal trials, and some
modern decisions endorse this view. 6 Finally, it has been suggested that an error hurting the
defense in criminal cases should lead to reversal of convictions unless it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt that it did not affect the judgment, and some modern authority endorses this
approach. 7
Appellants bear the burden of showing that error was committed, in civil and criminal cases
alike. Inevitably the task connects closely with arguments that error affected the judgment, and
both sides have substantially similar burdens in briefing and arguing this point. While all three
standards indicate that uncertainty over effect leads to reversal, appellants can take little comfort.
They do and must approach an appeal as if they bear the burden of establishing the effect of error. 8
Assessing error
Reviewing courts follow certain strategies for assessing errors in admitting or excluding evidence.
In two polar circumstances, the question whether error was harmless and the question of
sufficiency intersect. An error in admitting an item of evidence is not harmless if all the evidence
is sufficient only when that item is counted. An error in excluding an item is not harmless if what
is left is insufficient and the item would have made it sufficient. 9 In two other situations, other
evidence has great impact in assessing error. Sometimes other evidence strongly favors one side
or the other, or is barely adequate. If the evidence favoring the prevailing party seems
5. See United States v. Crosby, 75 F.3d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir. 1996).
6. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 35 (1970) (anything more lenient “entails too great a risk of affirming a
judgment that was influenced by an error” and would fail to deter appellate judges from focusing improperly on
correctness of result, and anything more stringent risks returning to the automatic reversal practice, which the
harmless error doctrine was designed to avoid). See United States v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747, 753 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 898; United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 917-918 (3d Cir. 1991).
7. See Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 991-997 (1973). See also Haddad v. Lockheed
California Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1458-1459 (9th Cir. 1983) (standard should “reflect the burden of proof” at trial).
8. See Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1045; K-B Trucking
Co. v. Riss Intl. Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1155-1156 (10th Cir. 1985).
9. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 834-835 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969.

overwhelming, even a serious mistake usually seems harmless. 10 If evidence favoring the
prevailing party seems barely adequate or closely balanced, even a small mistake might have
affected outcome and is not harmless. 11
Cumulative evidence
Appellate courts routinely describe cases as falling into an intermediate and less clearcut category
where other evidence seems more closely in balance. Here the presence of other evidence is harder
to assess, but reviewing courts routinely conclude that errors were harmless because the proof
affected by them was or would have been “cumulative.” This idea is helpful if it is understood to
mean that other evidence on the issue affected by the error is really quite strong, so it is hard to
imagine that proof erroneously admitted or excluded made or could have made a difference in
outcome. Here it is often plausible to conclude that an error in admitting evidence was harmless
because it was merely “cumulative” of abundant other evidence properly admitted, 12 and that an
error in excluding evidence was likewise harmless because it would have been merely cumulative
of other evidence admitted on the point. 13
Judicial discretion
One difficulty in predicating a claim of error on rulings admitting or excluding evidence lies in the
fact that the trial judge has broad discretion. In the first instance, she decides whether probative
worth is outweighed by the dangers and considerations described in FRE 403 (unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, waste of time), and she has considerable discretion to strike the balance. She
has less discretion where specific rules come into play, such as the hearsay doctrine and the
principles in FRE 404-412. But applying these specific rules often requires the judge to make
preliminary findings of fact under FRE 104(a), and here too she has leeway, since these are
normally reviewed under the “clear error” doctrine.
Curing error at trial
Often prejudice from error in admitting evidence can be cured at trial, and sometimes error in
10. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (error in admitting hearsay was not prejudicial since record
“fairly shrieks the guilt of the parties”); United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398, 411 (7th Cir. 1993) (error in asking
defendant about prior conviction was harmless, since evidence of guilt was “simply overwhelming”).
11. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 70-71 (1970) (when proof “is closely balanced or affords minimal
support for judgment,” error in admitting cannot be harmless).
12. See Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1057 (1st Cir. 1990) (since testimony was cumulative, court needed not
decide whether admitting it was error).
13. City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil of Cal., 46 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 1995) (error in excluding handwritten
notes was harmless; little probative value, cumulative); Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 865 F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir.
1988) (in light of other evidence, rulings excluding evidence did not affect substantial right).

excluding evidence. One common curative step is to instruct the jury by limiting the purposes for
which evidence may be considered, directing that it be disregarded, or explaining it in other ways.
Usually reviewing courts conclude that such instructions make any error in admitting evidence
harmless.
Cure by instruction
The first of these (limiting instruction) prevents or discourages improper use, reducing the
likelihood of prejudice or jury confusion. 14 The second (instruction to disregard) helps prevent
mistakes in admitting evidence from affecting outcome, or at least improves the chance for an
untainted verdict. 15 Sometimes such instructions are described in terms of “striking the evidence,”
and an after-stated objection is described as a “motion to strike,” these terms being dramatic ways
of describing the intended effect of this curative measure. The third (explanatory instruction) is
similar to the limiting instruction, but its purpose is to add context or perspective, so the jury can
reach a true understanding. 16
In oft-quoted and forceful language, Justice Jackson railed against this instruction to
disregard, bemoaning the “naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury” as one that “all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction,” and in
some settings this point has carried the day: For instance, the Bruton doctrine holds that error in
admitting a statement by one of several codefendants implicating another by name cannot be cured,
as a matter of constitutional principle, by telling the jury to consider the statement as evidence only
against the declarant. 17 And sometimes instructions do not succeed in neutralizing error: Evidence
erroneously admitted may be too explosive, or its effect may be made indelible by repetition, or
curative instructions may come too late or fail to convey the necessary message. 18
Cure by verdict
A second kind of cure occurs when a verdict shows the jury ruled in favor of appellant on the only
claims or charges affected by any error. “Saved-by-the-outcome” cures can neutralize errors in

14. Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 464 F.2d 976, 982 (3d Cir. 1972). Ordinarily courts only give such instructions
on request. See §1.16, infra.
15. See United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209; Worcester v. Pure
Torpedo Co., 127 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1942).
16.United States v. Corey, 566 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977); Duff v. Page, 249 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1957).
17. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) (Jackson concurring); see also Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968) (discussed in §8.28, infra).
18. Tipton v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 375 U.S. 34 (1963); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gosdin, 803 F.2d 1153,
1159-1160 (11th Cir. 1986).

both admitting and excluding evidence. 19
Cure by other evidence
A third kind of cure involves admitting other evidence that has the effect of rebutting or explaining
evidence erroneously admitted, thus keeping it from having unwanted effect. 20 It is of course the
theory of the doctrine letting parties “fight fire with fire” that the effect of evidence improperly
admitted can be neutralized in this way, and this doctrine has proved a reliable workhorse that
often satisfies reviewing courts. 21
Cure by mistrial
Finally, granting a mistrial can usually cure errors in admitting evidence. In criminal cases, the
constitutional right against double jeopardy would foreclose a second prosecution unless defendant
consents on the understanding that he will be tried again. For this reason alone, it is understandable
that defense refusal of an offer of mistrial waives the right to seek reversal on account of error
generating such an offer. 22
Error is usually considered harmless if it was invited by a party in eliciting a response from
a witness 23 or exploring a particular subject, thereby opening the door for the other side to
introduce rebuttal evidence. 24 But this doctrine may be applied unwisely, and a false step should
not open the gate to evidence that is inappropriate in tenor or disproportionate in impact. 25

19. United States v. Cammisano, 917 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1990); Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 991-992
(2d Cir. 1987).
20. United States v. Hefler, 159 F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 811.
21. See the discussion in §1.4, supra.
22. Ladakis v. United States, 283 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1960) (court offered to strike testimony or declare
mistrial; in choosing to proceed, defendant waived right to claim harm was not cured by instruction).
23. See United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505-506 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70, 7677 (5th Cir. 1979); Horibe v. Continental Baking Co., 298 F.2d 43, 45-46 (7th Cir. 1962).
24. Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281, 287 (10th Cir. 1977) (appellant may not complain of errors he induced or invited);
United States v. Benson, 495 F.2d 475, 478-479 (5th Cir. 1974) (defense may not create error by forcing the
government to introduce evidence and then claim on appeal that evidence was prejudicial), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1035.
25. United States v. Marrero, 486 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1973) (attacking identification testimony did not justify
proof that defendant’s name was in file of major violators).

